THE DOMINANCE OF THE 4-3-1-2
This season, 6 of 20 Serie A sides used the 4-3-1-2 system on a consistent basis. Generally, the system is structured around a strong midfield base to provide support for a creative trequartista. This applies to Albin Ekdal at Bologna, Alessandro Diamanti at Brescia , Wesley Sneijder at Inter and Andrea Cossu at Cagliari who tops the Serie A assist table with 13 assists.
Mariano Bogliacino at Chievo played at the trequartista position but the whole Chievo outfit was heavily involved in defensive duty due to the counter attacking nature of the side’s game while at Milan, the term, “forward destroyer” has been used to describe the trequartista, Kevin Prince Boateng. (The Milan midfield set-up broken down). These 6 sides with the exception of Milan deployed players as trequartista for their fantasia.
The forward 2 usually comprised of a seconda punta (second striker) tasked with some creative duties and prima punta (leading striker) tasked with goal-scoring. The duty of providing width for the side was up to the full-backs when overlapping and the seconda punta when drifting wide to stretch the defence. If the midfield could dominate the game, the full-backs then motored forward to create width for the side. Maicon (Inter) with 8 assists is testament to this. In the other 5 sides, none of the full backs have up to 4 assists. This is due to the fact that:
– Only Milan and Inter of these 6 sides dominate games enough to allow their full-backs consistently motor forward
– The presence of other systems in the league which pin down these full-backs such as the Udinese 3-5-2
– The failure of the forwards to take advantage of the ability of their full-backs to drive forward as seen with Milan where over the season, the player with the role of prima punta is vague.
Given that only 6 sides consistently played with the 4-3-1-2, the likely reason general belief is that Serie A sides play the 4-3-1-2 system is the fact that the top 2 sides, Milan and Inter, have used this system in the Champions League and other sides such as Roma have used this system at some point over the course of the season.
THE 4-4-2 DISASTERS
Over the course of the season, Bari, Genoa, Juventus and Sampdoria consistently used a 4-4-2 system. All these clubs had disappointing campaigns. Bari got relegated, Genoa continued their mid-table mediocrity as clubs with supposedly similar ambitions surged past them, Juventus failed to win a trophy or qualify for the Champions League while Sampdoria got relegated in the same season they played in the Champions League play-offs. This though isn’t proof of the the unsuitability of the 4-4-2 to the Serie A. While playing a 4-4-2 against teams that play with 3 or 4 players in the middle of the pack leaves a side outnumbered centrally, the 4-4-2 also tends to outnumber their opposition in wide areas. Bari finished 10th last season while Luigi Delneri got Sampdoria to 4th spot, entry into the Champions League play-offs, both playing 4-4-2.
These underwhelming campaigns can be attributed to different forms of bad management rather than tactical systems. Vincenzo Matarrese’s lack of ambition at Bari, Enrico Preziosi’s football manager style to player acquisition, the lack of key components in the Juventus squad and the effects of Riccardo Garrone being heavily involved with players due to absence of a Sporting Director at Sampdoria have largely been responsible for the demise of these clubs.
Proof of this can be seen with Franco Colomba’s brief spell at Parma at the end of the season. His record – played 7, 4 wins against Inter, Udinese, Palermo and Juventus, 2 draws and 1 loss all playing 4-4-2 or a variation of the system. With 2 wide players on both flanks in Francesco Valiani and Francesco Modesto, 2 midfield battlers in Blerim Dzemaili and Stefano Morrone, Sebastian Giovinco as seconda punta and Amauri leading the line, the squad excelled. During Colomba’s time at the club, all players (excluding forwards) with assists in the squad have been wide players. Just like Delneri at Sampdoria and Giampiero Ventura at Bari in the 2009/2010 season, given an adequate squad, a 4-4-2 can excel in the Serie A.
The Capital Clubs and 4-2-3-1
Both capital clubs, Lazio and Roma, ended up using a 4-2-3-1 formation for the vital part of their campaign. Though Claudio Ranieri had previously utilized the 4-3-1-2 system which saw Jérémy Ménez excel in the trequartista role, Vincenzo Montella, upon his appointment as coach, re-introduced Luciano Spalletti’s 4-2-3-1 strikerless formation from the 2006/2007 season.
While Lazio played a 4-2-3-1 with true striker, a reinvigorated Francesco Totti excelled playing as a false 9 at the top of Montella’s 4-2-3-1. During the final weeks of the campaign, he showed himself to still be ahead of most of his teammates with the level of his performances.
Luigi De Canio’s Lecce
Why should Lecce reserve a space for themselves? Simply, this is one manager who chopped and changed all season long. The side played 4-4-2, 4-3-2-1, 4-3-1-2, 4-1-4-1, 4-3-3, 3-5-2 and even 4-1-3-2. Whatever system the tactical chameleon employed, this side stayed true to the manager’s attacking philosophy. Conceding 66 goals (worst in Serie A) and scoring 46 goals (10th in Serie A), the clubs that scored more goals than Lecce were the top 9 clubs. The side really should have gone down, but thanks to the mediocrity displayed by some clubs and the attacking instincts De Canio was able to transfer to his players, Lecce avoided relegation.
THE ISSUE OF WIDTH
One of the criticisms of the league is the lack of width. Teams like Udinese and Napoli play with 3 centre-backs allowing the wing-backs the ability to start high up the pitch. This also allowed their wing-backs to press opposition fullbacks helping them to dominate their flanks. The wide movement of their attacking players, Ezequiel Lavezzi for Napoli and Alexis Sánchez at Udinese into wide regions helped the wide play of these two sides and increased their threat from wide positions. Something for people to get delighted about next year in the Champions League are Napoli tactics when the team needs a goal. The side possess a very unique ability to overload the opposition beginning with weird centre-back, Hugo Campagnaro’s forward runs.
Already mentioned is Colomba’s Parma. Another interesting side as regards width was Cesena who played a 4-3-3 system with overlapping full-backs (Luca Ceccarelli with 5 assists) and true wide players (Emanuele Giaccherini with 4 assists) either side of a lumbering target man. Fiorentina also utilized width in their attacking play whether they played 4-3-2-1, 4-3-3 or 4-2-3-1 with Alberto Gilardino being on the end of most of the created chances. Much was made early on in the season of Palermo 4-3-2-1 system which accommodated 2 trequartisti and 2 creative fullbacks. This system though was very dangerous as Palermo conceded 63 goals, 3 better than Lecce at 66. The midfield base allowed for shuttling midfielders to increase the side’s attacking options (6th best attack – 58 goals) and this left the defence without much cover. Communications problems at the back also cost the side.
THE USAGE OF WIDE PLAYERS CENTRALLY
Over the course of the season, a number of traditionally wide players have been deployed in central position. Juan Manuel Vargas has been deployed in midfield to great effect. Rafinha, in his first season in the Serie A at Genoa, was initially deployed at right-back and right wing-back before Gian Piero Gasperini, then Davide Ballardini began to deploy him centrally. Rafinha, easily described as a box-to-box full-back was played in central midfield. Unlike Vargas, there were fewer bodies around him in central midfield (Genoa played a 4-4-2), the transition was not easy, just like his transition from Germany to Italy. Overall, he failed to live up to the high expectations but nobody does at Genoa.
Gastón Ramírez, the Bologna left winger, has been deployed as trequartista and mostly as seconda punta. Ramírez has enjoyed a good season which has seen him linked with the likes of Roma and Inter. The most notable example of a wide player used centrally is Alexis Sánchez. Francesco Guidolin moved him centrally and effectively doubled his price tag. Guidolin has also deployed Juan Guillermo Cuadrado, a right wing-back in central midfield, over the course of the season for his energy.
EFFECT ON THE AZZURRI
Since becoming coach of the Azzurri, Cesare Prandelli had mostly used a 4-3-3 system even though Italy suffered from a dearth of quality wingers. Ever since a friendly against Romania in Novermber 2010, Prandelli has changed to the 4-3-1-2 system to suit the current crop of Italian players. With an abundance of central players in midfield, the presence of strikers whose game play suit playing as seconda punta or prima punta and the presence of suitable wing-backs, the 4-3-1-2 system appears to be the way forward for the Azzurri. Prandelli and his team just have to keep fine-tuning the system to ensure the team doesn’t get stuck as it was against Ireland in June 2011.
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