Three points in the bag and a very happy coach – that’s what we take home from this game. Denmark were anything but an irresistible opponent, so this match made for a good opportunity to take a look at what Cesare Prandelli wants his team to do, in the ideal case when the rivals let them do it.
The Azzurri took to the field with their usual diamond 4-4-2, and the game turned out to be lively and enjoyable. In the first half, the Italians opened a little tenuously, but eventually made the game their own. The Danes brought a lot of physicality and enthusiasm to the match, but tactically they were outmatched. It is true that they had a few chances, but we can attribute this to the fact that the Azzurri were playing a very offensive, rather risky type of football. In a certain sense, and with no disrespect to them at all, they were given more than they created.
The opening of the match made perspicuous one of the defining characteristics of Prandelli’s 4-4-2: it requires that the fullbacks play very high. Both Ignazio Abate and Federico Balzaretti spent their possession time no further back than their own midfield line. This is dictated by the fact that the midfield has no wingers at all. What happens normally is that the most creative of the two strikers drifts to a side, and the fullback comes up to meet him, effectively reproducing the type of cooperation you get with a winger. Potential defensive holes are (or should be) patched up by defensive midfielders such as Daniele De Rossi. This last bit is not always easy to perform, seen how one man has to cover for both flanks, and this is why Prandelli’s games are so entertaining to watch – both teams usually get a lot of opportunities coming forward.
The reason why the Azzurri were (relatively) slow at the beginning was to be found in the tactical overlap of the two strikers. Pablo Osvaldo and Mario Balotelli seemed to step into each other’s spaces. Prandelli, from the side-lines, kept screaming at Balotelli to open wide, seemingly expecting him to take up the role that used to be Antonio Cassano’s at Euro 2012. It is contentious whether this is a natural style for Balotelli. He seemed more at ease when Osvaldo was sent off, and his assist for Riccardo Montolivo’s first goal came while he was in a central position. Whether this game served to establish his natural role in the eyes of Prandelli remains to be seen – it certainly wasn’t a sign that he has ‘finally matured’, as some Italian reporters later claimed. Half the times when he lost the ball, he followed it by standing up and getting in arguments with the rivals or the referee. The coach might as well be fielding Popeye, as far as tactical discipline goes.
The Italian midfield was, yet again, the most heartening reality about the team, with superb performances by Montolivo (goal), De Rossi (goal), and Andrea Pirlo (two assists). The combination ‘Pirlo cross, De Rossi header’ is becoming a specialty of the house, like pizza in Neapolitan restaurants. Claudio Marchisio also did a fine job, bearing in mind that he was not in the best condition (and had to walk out with an injury). Considering the wealth of options that Italy have in reserve – Motta, Diamanti, Candreva, Giaccherini, Nocerino, Aquilani, eventually perhaps Poli, Cigarini, Florenzi – we may rightfully talk of a golden age of the Italian midfielder.
It has been noted that Italy’s midfield is rotatory, with different players taking up different roles and positions in alternation. This was very much on display throughout the duration of the entire game – notice how different Pirlo’s positions were on the occasion of his two assists. The impression from this match – and it can be no more than an impression, until more games confirm it – is that Prandelli is trying to get other midfielders to fill in for Pirlo’s duties.
This is absolutely necessary, not only because Pirlo becomes the object of a man-hunt whenever he puts his nose out of the changing rooms, but also because he is old, and may not be able to reach the Brazil tournament in full form (worse yet, he may miss out for injury). But we say that this is only an impression because we may have put the cart before the horse here – the fact that players like Montolivo and Marchisio were taking up some of the positions and passing duties of Pirlo may simply be due to the fact that the latter was unable to properly rid himself of his man-marking, thus creating the retrospective illusion that his colleagues had been instructed to fill in for him. This will need to be verified in future games.
Whatever Prandelli’s instructions, the midfielders communicated splendidly. Twice in the first half they breached through the Danes and found the goal. In the second half, when Osvaldo was sent off for a rather insubstantial foul (the poor man must still be swearing), the game changed faces. The Azzurri expected to be pressed hard and they regrouped, putting a brake on their offensive sorties. It was then that Balotelli’s ability truly emerged, as he constantly held the line up and provided numerous occasions to bring the game forwards. Eventually, one of these resulted in a goal, and the game went much more smoothly from then onwards. Balotelli was a sufficient threat to handle the Danish defence on his own, especially now that he was free to play down the middle. The defence efficiently contained the modest efforts of their adversaries, with Giorgio Chiellini in particular putting the clamps on Nicklas Bendtner, and Morgan De Sanctis doing a good job inbetween the posts (though fielding a 35 year old is probably not the best policy if we are meant to be looking for the heir to Gianluigi Buffon – why not Salvatore Sirigu, Emiliano Viviano or Andrea Consigli?).
A verdict on the game – and the team – had taken shaped even before it was all over. Essentially, this is a good-looking Italy because it is the same team we saw at Euro 2012. The tactical solutions are identical. We are still based on a highly technical nucleus of exchangeable central midfielders; we still ask one of our strikers to drift to the side (incidentally, the experiment of using two prime punte together must be deemed a failure – we still need one creative little guy up there, be it Cassano, Sebastian Giovinco, or someone else); we still complement this with fullbacks playing very high up; and we still resort to the long ball towards Balotelli when the opposing team widens the gap between midfield and defence. The dangers inherent in this set-up are two: firstly, an over-reliance on Pirlo, who is too fragile a player to be the fulcrum of the team. Secondly, the apparent lack of a Plan B in case we meet a team that can defeat this system (Spain, of course, but we also ignore what Brazil, Argentina and the rest of the South Americans may be capable of). Both of these deficiencies were made evident by the last tournament, so using the eighteen months left until the World Cup to patch them up must be Prandelli’s binding imperative. It doesn’t have to be done by reviving the 3-5-2, but an alternative option is very much called for.
